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If insects have phenomenal consciousness, could they suffer?
Commentary on Klein & Barron on Insect Experience

Elizabeth S. Paul & Michael T. Mendl
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Abstract: Klein & Barron’s (K & B’s) suggestion that insects have the capacity for
phenomenal consciousness is a refreshing and challenging departure from the cautious and
agnostic stance that is taken by many researchers when considering this possibility. It is
impossible to falsify the sceptic’s view that neural and behavioural parallels between humans
and insects need not imply either similar conscious experience or even any phenomenal
consciousness in insects at all. But if K & B are right, it is important to consider the possible
contents of insect consciousness. Here we discuss whether affective consciousness, with its
implications for potential suffering, might also be part of the simulated perceptual conscious
world that K & B propose.
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Klein & Barron (2016; henceforth K & B) follow Merker’s (2007) suggestion that dynamic
integration of sensory information about the environment and the organism’s place in it,
together with information about the organism’s current homeostatic requirements,
generates a neural model that provides a “unique, unified perspective on the world” (K & B,
p. 3) and produces consciousness. Merker argues that the vertebrate (human) midbrain is
necessary and sufficient for consciousness, and that it embodies the neural simulation
described above, integrating information from different decision-making domains —
motivation, target (goal) selection, and action selection via a common-currency “conscious
mode of function” (Merker, p. 71). K & B contend that the functional architecture of the
insect brain has many parallels with that of the vertebrate midbrain and is thus capable of
the same neural modelling, and hence of conscious experience.
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But is consciousness a necessary corollary of neural computations of this sort -- and does
evidence of a similar functional architecture in human and insect brains inevitably imply a
similar capacity for conscious experience? Even in humans, “blindsight” patients who are
unable to report consciously seeing anything in their impaired visual field can exhibit precise
real-time visually guided action and target selection (e.g., fine-tuning grasp to target size;
avoiding obstacles). Interestingly, when a short delay is introduced between visual access to
the task and task performance, these patients fail to fine-tune their movements or avoid
obstacles; hence under these circumstances conscious experience is required (Striemer et
al., 2009; Whitwell et al., 2011). Although damage to cortical pathways is involved in these
phenomena, and there is debate as to whether blindsight patients truly lack phenomenal
awareness in their impaired visual field (e.g., Merker), these findings raise the possibility that
insects show neural coordination of motivation, target selection and action in the absence of
conscious experience, at least in real-time. This possibility could be countered by good
performance in tasks where there is a delay between target selection and action or goal
acquisition. Sophisticated detour behaviour by jumping spiders hunting prey (Tarsitano &
Jackson, 1997) may provide one such example.
Notwithstanding these arguments, we find K & B’s proposal engaging and persuasive. We
will now consider the potential contents of insect consciousness, should K & B turn out to be
right. Although they avoid detailed consideration of this issue, K & B’s approach, like
Merker’s, emphasises a perceptual, visual perspective. Merker (p. 72) speculates that “in its
primitive beginnings, the ‘world’ of the proposed neural reality simulator presumably
amounted to no more than a two-dimensional screen-like map of spatial directions on which
potential targets might appear as mere loci of motion in an otherwise featureless noise field,
defined more by their displacement than by any object features.” Such imaginings of the
contents of subjective experience appear to sit well with K & B’s arguments for insect
consciousness. Although predominantly visual, the same principles could conceivably be
applied to a simulated world dominated by olfactory or auditory inputs.
Within this simulated world, K & B (p. 5) note that “The motivational and physiological states
of the organism prioritize target and action selection.” Goal prioritization and decisionmaking involve reward and punishment valuation mechanisms, adding an affective
dimension to the simulation and, potentially, to the contents of consciousness. A primarily
perceptually based consciousness could incorporate valuation of targets in a purely visual
way by representing important goals as larger or more intense visual signals in the simulated
world. Alternatively, affective consciousness – positively or negatively valenced feelings
induced by fitness-enhancing or threatening stimuli – may have preceded perceptual
experience as a common currency for evaluating different courses of action across
functionally distinct domains (Cabanac, 1992; Mendl et al., 2010). Or both perceptual and
affective consciousness may have emerged simultaneously as components of the simulated
world.
If either of the latter two scenarios applies in insects, the capacity for consciousness
suggested by K & B would include subjective experience of affect (e.g., emotions), thus
raising the possibility that insects can suffer, something that researchers and non-scientists
think unlikely (Paul, 1995). The implications would therefore be significant, particularly
ethically: At present insects are given no legal protection at all from harm. What is the
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evidence that affective consciousness may be part of the simulated world proposed by K &
B?
Darwin (2009/1872, p. 347) attributed human-like emotions to insects: “Even insects express
anger, terror, jealousy and love, by their stridulation.” For him, the functional and
behavioural similarities between human and animal behaviour in emotive situations (e.g., in
response to the arrival of a reward or a punisher) implied similarly subjective emotional
experiences. Insects certainly show behavioural responses that resemble the fundamental
features of emotions. Anderson & Adolphs (2014) call these “emotion primitives,” listing
elements such as valence, scalability, and persistence as being critical for assigning emotionlike states to non-human animals. Fruit flies (Drosophila melanogaster), for example, show
freezing and avoidance of a repeated looming shadow that becomes more intense with
repeated exposure, and persists across time even after the shadow is removed. Gibson et al.
(2015) argue that this reflects an emotion-like “internal defensive state” (p. 1401).
Perhaps more compelling than immediate responses to stimuli is evidence that animals have
background affective states, or “moods,” that function to moderate responses to events and
guide decision-making, particularly under ambiguity. We (Mendl et al., 2010) hypothesize
that an animal’s past experiences of reward and punishment across a range of functional
domains (e.g., foraging, predator avoidance, intra-specific competition) determine its
current mood state. Assuming a correlation between past experience and future probability
of rewards and punishers, individuals can then make use of their mood state to “best guess”
whether a novel or ambiguous stimulus is likely to be good or bad news; a negative mood
should lead to enhanced expectation of punishment and/or decreased expectation of
reward, resulting in cautious or “pessimistically” biased judgements of ambiguity (see also
Nettle & Bateson, 2012). Honeybees, like a wide range of vertebrate species (Harding et al.,
2004; Mendl et al., 2009; Gygax, 2014; Roelofs et al., 2016), show such affect-induced
judgement biases (Bateson et al., 2011). Humans appear to make such judgements by
reflecting on their subjective feelings, using the “how do I feel about it?” heuristic (Schwartz
& Clore, 1983; Paul et al., 2005). This raises the possibility that affective consciousness plays
a role in biasing judgements in insects and other invertebrates too.
Although these examples are suggestive of affect-like states in insects, they do not provide
conclusive evidence of conscious affective experience. Even in humans, there is no one-toone correspondence between reported emotional feelings and the behavioural and
physiological components of emotional states. For example, Winkielman et al. (2005) found
that participants viewing emotionally salient images showed behaviour indicative of an
altered affective state (enhanced “liking” of a sweet drink, expressed through willingness to
drink more and pay more for it) despite the absence of any change in subjectively
experienced pleasure when consuming the drink. In terms of affect-induced judgement
biases, it is possible to conceive a neural mechanism that reflects cumulative experience of
reward and punishment and interfaces with action selection processes without needing to
invoke conscious experience (Mendl et al., 2011). A candidate is changes in tonic firing of PPL
and PAM dopaminergic neurones that code the valence of sensory input and moderate the
balance of approach and avoidance tendencies in D. melanogaster (Aso et al., 2014). As
Anderson & Adolphs (2014) note, descriptions of (and inferences from) behavioural
observations should be separated from conclusions about subjective experience: “animals,

3

Animal Sentience 2016.128: Paul & Mendl on Klein & Barron on Insect Experience

like humans, have central emotion states even if they are not consciously aware of them” (p.
190). In other words, neurophysiological and behavioural evidence of (operationally defined)
affect-like states in non-human animals need not imply that such states are felt (sentient).
K & B’s challenging proposal urges us to think more deeply about the possibility that insects
have the capacity for consciousness. If they are right, the obvious next question concerns the
contents of insect subjective experience and, from an ethical standpoint, whether there is an
affective component. A number of approaches can build on K & B’s arguments to start
investigating the possible existence of insect affect and address the inevitable question that
will arise about whether the operationally identified affect-like processes are actually being
felt.
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